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Executive bonus compensation and financial leverage: Do growth and executive ownership 
matter? 
Abstract
Purpose: This study examines the impact of executive bonus compensation on a firm’s financial 
leverage policy and the extent to which this compensation–leverage relation is moderated by firm 
growth and executive ownership. 
Design/method/approach: Using data from 213 non-financial and non-utility UK FTSE 350 firms 
for the period 2007– 2015, generating a total of 1,784 firm-year observations, panel econometric 
methods are employed to test our model. 
 
Findings: Drawing insights from agency theoretic view, we uncover that managerial cash bonus 
compensation is negatively and significantly related to financial leverage. However, stock bonus 
compensation has a positive and significant impact on leverage. We also observe that 
compensation–leverage is moderated by both firm growth and executive ownership. Our results 
remain robust to alternative econometric models. 
Originality/value: While this paper builds on the executive bonus compensation literature, it is 
the first – to the best of our knowledge – to explore the bonus compensation-corporate financial 
leverage and, particularly, examine the extent to which firm growth and corporate executive 
ownership matter in this relationship. 
Keywords: Executive bonus compensation; leverage; UK.
JEL Classification: G30, G32, G34

































































Executive compensation has garnered a great deal of attention from both academics and non-
academics. This attention stems in part from flaws in various corporate compensation practices 
which were revealed following the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. It is therefore not surprising 
that shareholder votes on executive compensation have been introduced in several countries within 
Europe (see e.g. Ferri & Maber, 2013). Broadly, prior scholarly work suggests that executive bonus 
compensation can be used as a tool in aligning the interests of corporate managers with those of 
shareholders (Balafas & Florackis, 2014; Kaplan & Rauh, 2010; Ortiz-Molina, 2007). Indeed, 
effective bonus compensation policies, such as incentive-based pay, could persuade firm executives 
to employ costly effort to enhance the future growth opportunities of their firms, thereby eliminating 
the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders, and this eventually creates shareholder 
value. Accordingly, the agency problem between corporate managers and shareholders is minimised 
through optimal compensation incentives (Balafas & Florackis, 2014; Grout & Zalewska, 2010; 
Ortiz-Molina, 2007; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Notwithstanding the growing theoretical and 
empirical interest in executive bonus compensation, our understanding of the strategic implication 
of executive bonus compensation is far from complete. Results from prior scholarly advances have 
been mixed and unclear. Thus, in this study, we examine the influence of both cash bonus 
compensation and stock bonus compensation on a firm’s financial leverage policy by using panel 
data of 213 non-financial and non-utility UK FTSE 350 firms for the period 2007–2015. Examining 
these executive bonus compensations on firm capital structure decision is important because it 
provides important insight into how top management incentives affect firms’ key strategic decision 
– capital structure decision. Further, we seek to understand the extent to which the executive bonus 
compensation–leverage relation is conditional on firm growth and executive ownership.
By way of preview, the evidence obtained in this study shows that executive cash bonus 
compensation negatively impacts firm leverage. This suggests that incentives for executives to 
adopt excessive financial leverage are lessened through the adoption of cash bonus. In effect, 
executives with cash bonus incentives are motivated to generate enough cash flow which enables 
the firm to sponsor corporate activities with internally generated funds. Thus, this reduces the 
likelihood of bankruptcy conflict as a result of less usage of debt within the capital structure of the 
firm. However, our analysis reveals that executives’ stock bonus compensation has a positive and 
significant influence on a firm’s financial leverage. This suggests that stock-based bonus induces 

































































executives to allow greater debt levels in the capital structure of their firms. Also, we find that 
growth opportunity negatively moderates both cash bonus compensation–leverage and stock bonus 
compensation-leverage relationships. Further, we observe that executive ownership negatively 
moderates the stock-based bonus–leverage relationship. This suggests that executives with large 
ownership stakes prefer to keep a lower leverage ratio in the firm’s capital structure to minimise 
their personal and economic risks resulting from the firm’s possible bankruptcy risk (Grossman & 
Hart, 1982). Additionally, because debtholders and other lenders are likely to monitor and restrain 
managerial activities, executives with more ownership stakes may have an opportune incentive to 
lower debt levels to prevent external control (Brailsford et al., 2002). Indeed, we conduct several 
tests to ascertain the robustness of our results. First, we measure both executive cash and stock 
bonus compensations by using alternative proxies. Second, in addition to OLS estimation, we use 
the fixed effects model to deal with time-invariant covariates. Finally, we address the issue of 
endogeneity and reverse causality using both predicted model approach and three-stage least 
squares (3SLS) estimations. Our results remain robust to all these tests and alternative estimations 
used to analyse the data. 
We make primary contributions to the literature in the following ways. First, we contribute to the 
literature examining executive bonus compensation-corporate policy nexus (e.g. Haque & Ntim, 
2020; Zhang et al., 2019; Lin et al., 2011; Kini & Williams, 2012). While this paper builds on the 
executive bonus compensation literature, it is the first – to the best of our knowledge – to explore 
the bonus compensation-corporate financial leverage and, particularly, examine the extent to which 
firm growth and executive ownership matter in this relationship with specific emphasis on UK 
FTSE 350 firms. Our second contribution stems from the role of firm growth opportunity in the 
bonus compensation-financial leverage relationship. Here, we demonstrate the significant role of 
firm-level characteristic in explaining the bonus compensation-leverage relationship. Our third 
contribution is in relation to the moderating role of executive ownership. Here, we demonstrate that 
executive ownership is crucial in curtailing or lowering a firm’s use of financial leverage. As 
executives’ residual interests increase, they become conscious of the firm’s idiosyncratic risk, and 
hence decrease the leverage level, which is suggestive of managerial opportunism. Thus, by 
increasing executive ownership, a firm is able to mitigate the probability of bankruptcy. 
The remainder of the article is structured along these lines: section 2 reviews related literature. 
Section 3 considers data and empirical methods. Section 4 presents and discusses results, and, 
finally, section 5 concludes.


































































From the agency theoretic view, corporate top executives are often portrayed in the literature as 
being self-interested and risk-averse (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1989). Motivated by their risk aversion, executives are likely to have an incentive to make less risky 
decisions that pose minimal risk exposure to their interests. An executive’s risk-related incentive 
may have important implications for optimal corporate policies and the ultimate value for risk-
neutral shareholders. For example, a risk-averse executive may fail to sponsor a valuable investment 
project with debt because an increase in a firm’s leverage exacerbates financial distress and possible 
bankruptcy risks, which the executive would prefer to avoid. This is because such a policy may 
potentially amplify his/her personal and economic risks (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Anticipating 
this, shareholders may design executives’ bonus compensation in such a way that it can influence 
executives to make value-enhancing decisions (Coles et al., 2006; Kini & Williams, 2012). 
Stemming from this, literature suggests that stock-based bonus compensation rather than cash-based 
bonus compensation gives executives the correct incentive to maximise firm value by reducing the 
executives’ risk-related incentive problem (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). This is because, by rewarding 
risk-averse executives with stock-based bonus compensation, they bear part of the costs of their 
actions, which in turn causes them to optimally borrow to sponsor corporate activities, particularly 
when internal sources are insufficient. Thus, cash bonus compensation incentives discourage 
executives’ risk-taking appetite (Coles et al. 2006; Berger et al. 1997). This is unsurprising, given 
that, by keeping a firm’s leverage below the optimal level, the firm is likely to generate excess cash 
flow, albeit lower interest payment, thereby making it easy for shareholders to apply more cash 
bonuses to reward executives. Consistent with this view, John and John (1993) contend that firms 
with lower leverage are likely to safeguard bondholders’ interests, which can lead to lower future 
costs of debt finance. Broadly speaking, the distinctive nature of bonus compensation components 
poses different risk-related incentives to executives and this in turn influences how they make 
corporate decisions (Cassell et al., 2012; Kini & Williams, 2012). 
In a related manner, Kabir et al. (2013) further broaden the discussion on executive bonus 
compensations by investigating how different compensation components affect a firm’s cost of 
debt. Their evidence shows that CEOs’ pension benefit and cash bonus compensation decrease bond 
yield spread while stock options increase cost of debt. They conclude that bondholders are fully 
aware of both risk-taking and risk-avoiding incentives created by these components of executive 

































































compensation. Along the same lines, Cassell et al. (2012) observe that CEOs with more inside debt 
compensation (defined as pension benefits and restricted incentives) display lower levels of risk-
seeking behaviour. They make this suggestion after their empirical findings reveal that executives 
with large inside debt holdings prefer investment and financial policies that are less risky. Kim, Li 
and Zhang (2011) also suggest that chief financial officer’s (CFO’s) stock option compensation is 
more sensitive to the firm’s stock market crash risk and that the relationship is more pronounced 
for those firms with a high level of financial leverage. Kini and Williams (2012) make a further 
extension by suggesting that senior executives with stock-based compensation carry out more risky 
firm activities to increase their chance of promotion to the rank of CEO. 
Along similar lines, Ryan and Wiggins (2001) argue that shareholders of firms with growth 
opportunities tend to reward executives with more stock-based and less cash-based compensation 
to influence them to embark on quality corporate policies. This outcome is echoed in the work of 
Humphery-Jenner et al. (2016) which posits that shareholders of growth-potential firms use more 
stock-based bonus compensation to exploit executive overconfidence incentives. In the same vein, 
Core et al. (1999) observe an increasing relationship between firm growth opportunities and 
executive compensation.
Relatedly, the literature further indicates that, in firms where executives own large stakes, 
shareholders use less incentive compensation to align their interests with those executives (Core et 
al., 1999; Ryan & Wiggins, 2001; Hartzell & Starks, 2003). Other authors also suggest that 
executives with large ownership stakes can easily influence the firm’s board to gain higher salaries 
and bonuses (Cheung et al., 2005; Weisbach, 2007) and that these executives are more likely to 
pursue policies that suit their own interests (Gormley & Matsa, 2016; Brick, Palmon, & Wald, 
2012). For instance, Gormley and Matsa (2016) observe that executives’ incentive to play it safe 
increases when they hold large stakes in the firm and one avenue they often adopt is to lower the 
firm’s risk (Florackis & Ozkan, 2009; Berger et al., 1997). Clearly, based on this evidence, it is 
plausible that executive ownership may dynamically interact with executive bonus compensation 
to affect corporate policies. 
Indeed, despite the various theoretical and empirical explanations reviewed above, we have little 
understanding of the effects of executive bonus compensation on firm leverage policy as results 
from prior scholarly advances have been mainly mixed and unclear. Thus, we seek to shed light on 
this.



































































We use data from UK FTSE 350 firms spanning 2007 to 2015. Specifically, the dataset was obtained 
from two sources: we manually collected data on top three executives’ (CEO – chief executive 
officer, CFO – chief financial officer and COO – chief operating officer) compensation (i.e. salary, 
cash bonus and stock bonus), executives’ ownership stakes, and other corporate governance 
variables (large stakeholders and non-executives’ ownership) from the firms’ annual reports, whilst 
accounting and financial data were sourced from the COMPUSTAT database. Further, because 
firms operating in financial and utility industries tend to have different capital structures and often 
face other regulatory constraints which may implicitly affect executives’ decisions, we excluded 
these firms from our analysis (see Coles et al., 2006; Chava & Purnanandam, 2010; Kini & William, 
2012). Thus, we based our analysis on a total number of 1,784 firm-year observations for 213 firms 
operating in nine industries over a nine-year period.
 
3.2. Measurement of variables
3.2.1. Dependent variable – financial leverage
Financial leverage (LEV) was used as our dependent variable. This variable was measured as the 
ratio of total book value of debt to the book value of total assets (Coles et al., 2006; Florackis & 
Ozkan, 2009; Chava & Purnanandam, 2010).
3.2.2. Independent variables 
Two independent variables are tested in this study. These are cash bonus compensation (CB) and 
stock bonus compensation (SB). Consistent with Kabir et al. (2010), we measure the cash bonus 
compensation (CB) variable as annual cash bonus scaled by total sales, whilst the stock bonus 
compensation variable is measured as the sum values of performance stock and deferred stock (DS) 
scaled by total sales. As an alternative measure for robustness check, we scaled each bonus 
compensation component: cash bonus compensation (CB2) and stock bonus compensation (SB2) 
by total compensation (defined as the sum of annual salary, cash bonus and stock bonus). This is 
consistent with prior works (Kabir et al., 2013; Kini & Williams, 2012; Coles et al., 2006). 


































































Also, we accounted for the following control variables: salary (SAL), measured as annual salary 
scaled by total sales; natural logarithm of total sales to proxy for firm size (SZ); growth 
opportunities, defined as market value of assets to book value of assets to proxy for growth (GR); 
return on assets (ROA), defined as EBITDA scaled by total assets; stock return, which shows the 
firm’s annual stock return (STKR) over the fiscal year; cash holdings (CH), defined as cash and 
cash equivalence scaled by total assets; cash flow (CF), defined as free cash flow scaled by total 
assets; financial distress (Z-score, ZSC), to proxy for probability of bankruptcy; tangibility, defined 
as net investment in property, plant and equipment (TAN); and research and development (RD), 
measured as R&D expenses scaled by total assets. Again, our model also accounted for executives’ 
ownership (EO%), measured as percentage of stock ownership held by executives. This is because 
a firm’s shareholders tend to consider executives’ ownership levels when designing executives’ 
compensation incentives (Ryan and Wiggins, 2001; Core et al., 1999). Other governance variables 
were also included in our models: large shareholders ownership (LO%), measured as percentage of 
equity ownership greater than 3%; and non-executive ownership (NEO%), measured as the 
percentage of non-executives’ ownership. The inclusion of governance variables is in the spirit of 
prior works (e.g. Florackis and Ozkan, 2009; Ryan & Wiggins, 2001; Core et al., 1999). The 
acronyms and definitions of all the variables are provided in Table 1. 
[Table 1 about here]
3.3. Model specification
In this section, we model the empirical relationship between executive bonus compensation and 
financial leverage. Specifically, we employed the following econometric framework: 
 =  +  +   +   ………………………………..……….. (1)𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 𝛼 𝛽1𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 𝛽2𝑆𝐵𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽3𝐶 𝑡 𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑡
In equation (1), LEV is the financial leverage, while CB and SB are executives’ cash bonus 
compensation and stock bonus compensation respectively. Definitions of all the variables are 
provided in Table 1. In estimating equation (1), we initially use an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression approach where independent variables are lagged by one year to minimise the potential 

































































reverse causality problem. We estimate the fixed effects (FE) model as an alternative specification 
for robustness checks. Further, we also adopt a predicted model approach (i.e. two-step approach 
using 2SLS) and a simultaneous systems of equations (using 3SLS) technique to account for 
possible endogeneity issues (Kini & Williams, 2012; Coles et al., 2012; Coles et al., 2006). 
[Tables 2 & 3 about here]
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Summary statistics and bivariate correlations 
In Table 2, we present the summary statistics of the variables used in this study. A few findings are 
worth pointing out. The average value of cash bonus compensation (CB) is 0.59 and has a standard 
deviation of 21.14. This variable has a minimum value of 0.00 and a maximum value of 116.91, 
signifying a high degree of heterogeneity, while stock bonus (SB) mean (standard deviation) is 1.57 
(54.54) with 0.00 and 357.45 for minimum and maximum respectively. Also, the average value of 
leverage (LEV) is 0.29. This variable has minimum and maximum values of 0.00 and 2.71 
respectively. In all, the low figure may reflect the fact that the investigated firms are mainly equity 
financed. 
In Table 3, we present the correlation between all the variables used in this study. In general, the 
evidence obtained from the correlation matrix, as well as the descriptive statistics, suggests that our 
sample does not seem to suffer from any serious issues such as multicollinearity, limited variation 
and heterogeneity or large outliers.
4.2. Univariate analysis 
Table 4 shows univariate mean and standard deviation comparisons of the variables used by 
leverage quartiles. To perform this, we segregated firms into quartiles based on their leverage levels 
and tested whether variable characteristics differ across low-leverage (1st quartile) and high-
leverage (4th quartile) levels. The mean of salary in low-leverage firms is lower than that in high-
leverage firms while the mean of cash bonus compensation (CB) in low-leverage firms is lower 
than that in high-leverage firms. For the cash bonus, it is plausible to argue that high-leverage firms 
spend less on interest payment, which in turn gives these firms a leeway to store enough cash 

































































balance and can motivate executives to use more cash bonuses. However, the mean differences 
marginally missed out on significance. The mean of stock bonus compensation (SB) in low-leverage 
firms is lower than that in high-leverage firms, implying that more stock bonus executives use a 
higher leverage ratio.
Moreover, the findings on other firm characteristics are largely consistent with most of the extant 
literature (Florackis & Ozkan, 2009; Antoniou et al., 2008). For instance, Florackis and Ozkan 
(2009) show that low-leverage firms normally have lower tangible assets (TAN), higher 
performance (return on assets – ROA and stock return – STKR), higher cash holdings (CH), higher 
cash flow (CF) and higher growth (GR) than high-leverage firms. Again, it is also observed that 
low-leverage firms usually have larger R&D spending than high-leverage ones. The reported mean 
differences are all significant. 
The table further revealed that the mean values of executive ownership and large shareholders in 
low-leverage firms are higher than that of high-leverage ones, implying that managers and large 
shareholders become risk-cautious as their residual interests go up (Florackis & Ozkan, 2009). 
In brief, the univariate analysis shows how cash bonus and stock bonus compensation and other 
firm characteristics behave across different leverage levels. 
 [Table 4 about here]
4.3. The effect of executive bonus compensation on leverage
In Table 5, we present the empirical results of our baseline regression model of the effect of cash 
bonus (CB) and stock bonus (SB) compensations on leverage (LEV). We employ two main 
estimation methods in testing our model: ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed effects. Our main 
results are based on OLS models: 1, 3 & 5, while models 2, 4 & 6 (alternative specification – FE) 
are used for robustness purposes. Specifically, Model 1 shows that the relationship between cash 
bonus compensation (CB) and financial leverage (LEV) is negative and statistically significant at 
the 1% level. The coefficient estimate for this variable is -0.310 and has a t-statistics of -2.13, 
suggesting that an increase in cash bonus compensation (CB) is associated with lower firm leverage. 
This finding supports the assertion that shareholders’ usage of earning-based cash bonus 
compensation induces executives’ risk-reduction incentive, leading to lower firm leverage (Coles 
et al., 2006; Harris & Raviv, 1979). With regard to stock bonus compensation (SB) in Model 3, the 

































































coefficient estimate is positive and statistically significant. Specifically, the coefficient is 0.792 (t-
statistics 2.06), implying that higher stock bonus (SB) compensation influences executives’ risk-
taking incentive to increase firm leverage, which supports Kini and Williams’ (2012) contention. 
Our results remain qualitatively similar across the FE models. Moreover, in models 5 and 6, we 
include both cash bonus (CB) and stock bonus (SB) compensation and our results further collaborate 
what is already reported in models 1 - 4. 
Turning to the c ntrol variables, salary (SAL) is positive and significant, suggesting that executives 
show less risk-averse behaviour as their salary increases. This is unsurprising because salary forms 
the base pay upon which compensation from other risk-related bonuses largely depends. Cash flow 
(CF), asset tangibility (TAN), executive ownership (EO) and non-executive ownership (NEO) are 
positive and significant, whilst growth (GR), stock return (STKR), cash holdings (CH) and 
bankruptcy risk (ZS) are significantly negative.          
                                                                                 
[Table 5 about here]
4.4. Robustness checks 
Our results presented in Table 5 show that both cash bonus (CB) and stock bonus (SB) 
compensations differently affect firm financial leverage. In this section, we further test if indeed our 
results are robust to alternative measures of our independent variables and different econometric 
specifications. We begin with Table 6, where we use alternative measures of our independent 
variables. Specifically, we measure our alternative independent variables (CB2 and SB2) as cash 
bonus compensation scaled by total sales (i.e. CB2), and also SB2 as stock bonus compensation 
scaled by total sales. We observe that the coefficient estimates on cash bonus compensation (CB2) 
and stock bonus compensation (SB2) are qualitatively similar to the main results in Table 5. 
Further, in Table 7, we again re-estimate our model using the predicted approach. In this method, 
the lagged of each compensation bonus variable (i.e. lagged CB and SB) is first regressed on 
leverage and other control variables (control variables as defined in Table 1) to obtain predicted 
cash bonus (CB) and stock bonus (SB) compensation values, and then the predicted values are 
included in the leverage model, similar to Coles et al. (2006). As shown, the predicted model reports 
a cash bonus (CB) sign that is still negative, while stock bonus compensation (SB) shows a positive 
sign; both results are similar to our main results reported in Table 5. 

































































Furthermore, despite our attempt to deal with the endogeneity problem, employing different 
specifications, fixed effects (FE) and predicted models, the issue of direct causation is still a major 
concern, as we note there are hypotheses that suggest leverage drives a firm’s compensation policy 
(Duru et al., 2005; Ryan & Wiggins, 2001). For instance, it is argued that shareholders of a high-
leverage firm tend to structure executives’ compensation to include more cash bonuses and fewer 
stock bonuses in order to reduce executives’ risk-taking activities (Duru et al., 2005; John & John, 
1993). Also, high-growth firms often tend to use more stock bonus and less cash bonus 
compensation to reward managers (Guay, 1999), while firms with high cash reserves are likely to 
reward managers with more cash bonuses and fewer stock-based ones (Core & Guay, 1999). These 
intuitive arguments are likely to complicate the direct causation of executives’ compensation on 
leverage. Thus, to further account for the possibility that leverage and executive compensation are 
simultaneously determined, we estimate simultaneous systems of equations in which the jointly 
determined variables – leverage, cash bonus and stock bonus compensations – are simultaneously 
estimated. In the simultaneous systems of equations, the first-stage equation, i.e. each compensation 
component (CB/SB), is regressed on leverage, instruments and other determinants (i.e. controls 
defined in Table 1) to obtain the predicted values of bonus compensations (CB, SB), which is then 
included in the second-stage equation, i.e. the leverage model. Consistent with other empirical 
studies (e.g. Coles et al., 2006; Kini & Williams, 2012), we use contemporaneous values of cash 
bonus and/or stock bonus compensation variable instead of lagged values. Again, our findings 
obtained in Table 7 (simultaneous systems of equations – 3SLS) show that the sign of the coefficient 
of the independent variables CB and SB remain qualitatively similar to is the results already reported 
in Table 5. In short, the 3SLS results suggest that our earlier findings are not plagued by endogeneity 
problems and that the main results reported in Table 5 are robust to an alternative econometric 
specification.
[Tables 6 & 7 about here]
4.5. Executive compensation and leverage – the role of growth 
The evidence presented above suggests that executives’ bonus compensation impacts on firm 
leverage policy. However, literature suggests that firms with more growth potential tend to use less 
cash bonus but more stock bonus compensation to incentivise executives (Guay, 1999; Ryan & 

































































Wiggins, 2001). Thus, in this section, we examine the role of firm growth in the executives’ bonus 
compensation–leverage relationship. We follow existing studies (e.g. Florackis & Ozkan, 2009; 
Coles et al., 2006) and use market-to-book as our measure of firm growth (GR). The growth variable 
(GR) is interacted with each cash bonus and stock bonus compensation (CB and SB) and then they 
are included in our regression models. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 8 (models 
1 and 2). The results reveal that the estimated coefficient on the interaction term (CB x GR) is 
negative and statistically significant. This finding suggests that, ceteris paribus, executives of 
growth-opportunity firms with cash bonus compensation tend to decrease firm leverage. Also, we 
observe that the interaction term for SB x GR is negative and significant. A possible explanation 
could be that, as executives receive more stock bonus (SB) compensation in a growth firm, they 
become worried about their increased residual interests and are likely to lower the firm’s risky 
borrowings in an attempt to safeguard these residual interests (Berger et al., 1997; Brounen et al., 
2006; Florackis & Ozkan, 2009). Therefore, this makes it financially prudent for stock-motivated 
executives in such growth-opportunity firms to sponsor corporate activities with equity finance 
rather than debt (leverage) finance. 
4.6. Executive compensation and leverage – the role of executive ownership  
The key motive of compensation is to induce executives to increase firm value by selecting optimal 
policies including leverage (e.g. Kini & Williams, 2012; Coles et al., 2006). That is, through 
compensation, executives and shareholders’ interests are properly aligned. The literature further 
indicates that, in firms where executives own large stakes, shareholders use less incentive 
compensation to align their interests with those executives (Ryan & Wiggins, 2001; Hartzell & 
Starks, 2003). Others also argue that executives with large ownership stakes can easily influence 
the board for higher salaries and bonuses (Cheung et al., 2005; Weisbach, 2007) and that such 
executives are more likely to pursue policies that suit their own interests (Gormley & Matsa, 2016; 
Brick, Palmon, & Wald, 2012). For instance, Gormley and Matsa (2016) observe that executives’ 
incentive to play it safe increases when they hold large stakes in the firm and one avenue they can 
adopt is to lower the firm’s risk via lower leverage (Florackis & Ozkan, 2009; Berger et al., 1997). 
Based on the above argument, in this section, we examine the extent to which executive ownership 
moderates the executive bonus compensation–leverage relationship. Specifically, we construct 
executive’s ownership variable (EO) as the percentage of stock ownership held by executives 
(defined in Table 1) (Florackis & Ozkan, 2009; Ryan & Wiggins, 2001). We interact the executive 

































































ownership (EO) variable with the independent variables (cash bonus – CB x EO and stock bonus – 
SB x EO) and include them in our regression model. The results of this are presented in models 3 
and 4 of Table 5. We find the coefficient of CB x EO is negative but statistically insignificant, whilst 
in Model 4 we observe that the interaction term (SB x EO) is negative and it is both economically 
and statistically significant (coefficient -4.835 t-statistics 5.00). This suggests that stock-motivated 
executives with large ownership stakes may prefer to keep a lower leverage ratio in the firm’s books. 
This is not surprising, given that, if the firm has a higher leverage ratio, this risks executives’ private 
incentives associated with their undiversified shareholdings or ownership, thus they have incentives 
to reduce leverage as their holdings increase. Another possible legitimate explanation is that, if an 
executive has a large ownership stake, this may lead to an increase in the executive’s opportunism, 
and hence decreased debt levels (Brailsford et al., 2002). This evidence is suggestive of executives’ 
risk preference effect, where they play it safe to protect their private interests (Gormley & Matsa, 
2016). 
  [Table 8 about here]
5. Conclusion and implications
In this paper, we examine how executive bonus compensation affects firm financial leverage policy 
and the extent to which this relationship is conditional on firm growth and executive ownership. 
We observe that the executives’ cash bonus compensation–leverage relationship is negative and 
significant across all our models, while executive stock bonus compensation shows a positive effect 
on leverage. Significantly, the results are robust to all our adopted econometric specifications, 
including three-stage least squares (3SLS) which account for the simultaneous determination of 
executive compensation and the firm’s leverage policy. Essentially, our results offer support for the 
risk-related argument under the optimal compensation theory (Coles et al., 2006). Further, our study 
shows that both a firm’s growth and its executive ownership matter in this compensation–leverage 
linkage. Notwithstanding these useful findings, there are a few limitations worth noting. First, our 
study is based on UK FTSE 350 firms. Although the UK shares many characteristics with other 
developed economies, this is not enough to provide a basis for the generalisation of our findings. It 
is important to point out that there are certain institutional differences across different economies. 

































































There is a possibility that the executive compensation bonuses–financial leverage relationship might 
differ from other developed contexts. Thus, future studies can offer further insight by extending our 
findings to both emerging and developed economies. Future studies may also consider whether the 
2007-2008 financial crisis matters in this executive compensation–financial leverage relationship. 
Also, comparison of studies along industrial lines can be carried out to understand how the executive 
bonus compensation–financial policies relationship matters across different industries.
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Table 1: Description of variables
Dependent Variable Description        Literature
Leverage (LEV) long-term debt plus short-term debt scaled by total assets
Coles et al. 2006; Chava and 
Purnanandam, 2010
Independent variable
Cash bonus (CB) Cash bonus compensation scaled by total sales. Kabir et al. (2010)
Stock bonus (SB) Stock bonus compensation scaled by total sales. 
Kabir et al. (2010) Kabir et al. 
(2013)
Cash bonus (CB2) Cash bonus scaled by total compensation 
Kabir et al. (2013), Coles et al. 
(2006)
Stock bonus (SB2) Stock bonus scaled by total compensation 
Kabir et al. (2013) Coles et al. 
(2006).
Salary (SAL) Salary scaled by total sales Kabir et al. (2010) Kabir et al. (2013).
Salary (SAL2) Salary scaled by total compensation Kabir et al. (2013) Coles et al. (2006).
Total compensation Sum of salary, cash bonus and stock bonus
Kabir et al. (2013) Coles et al. 
(2006).
Control variables
Firm Size (SZ) Natural logarithm of total sales Coles et al. 2006
Growth (GR) [Total Assets – Book Equity + Market Equity] / total assets
Floarackis et al. 2009; Chava & 
Purnanandam, 2010
Firm performance (ROA) EBITDA scaled by total assets
Coles et al. 2006; Firth, Fung & 
Rui, 2006; Florackis et al. 
2009. 
Annual stock return (STKR) Annual stock return Coles et al. 2006
Cash holdings (CH) Cash and cash equivalence scaled by total assets. 
Cash flow (CF) Free cash flow scaled by total assets Coles et al. 2006
Research and Development 
(R&D)
R&D expense scaled by total assets Coles et al. 2006; Ryan and 
Wiggins, 2001
Assets Tangibility (PPE)
Net Property, Plant and Equipment / total 
assets
Coles et al. 2006; Chava and 
Purnanandam, 2010
Altman’s Z-score (Z-SC)
[ 3.3 (EBIT / Total Assets) + 1.0 (Sales / 
Total Assets) + 1.4 (Retained Profits / 
Total Assets) + 1.2 (Working Capital / total 
assets)]
Chava and Purnanandam 2010
Executives Ownership (%) (EO)
Total annual shareholdings of the three 
executives (CEO, CFO and Chief operating 
officer) divided by the firm’s total common 
shareholdings
Florackis et al. (2009), Ryan 
and Wiggins (2001) Core et al. 
(1999)
Non-executives’ ownership (%) 
NEO)
Total annual shareholdings of non-
executive directors divided by the 
firm’s total common shareholding
Mehran (1995)
Large ownership % (LO)
Total shareholdings of large owners 
(defined as ownership 
above 3%) scaled by the total number of 
common shareholdings
Florackis et al. 2009; Ryan and 
Wiggins, 2001; Core et al. 1999

































































Table 2: Descriptive statistics
     Mean St. Dev. Min Maxi 25% 50% 75% N
LEV 0.29 0.22 0.00 2.71 0.14 0.25 0.38 1606
CB 0.59 21.14 0.00 116.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 1748
SB 1.57 54.54 0.00 357.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 1748
SAL 1.13 38.84 0.00 268.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 1748
CB2 0.21 0.14 0.00 0.89 0.12 0.20 0.28 1748
SB2 0.45 0.21 0.00 0.98 0.34 0.48 0.59 1748
SAL2 0.34 0.18 0.00 1.00 0.23 0.31 0.41 1748
SZ 9.02 0.87 0.00 11.51 8.60 8.99 9.47 1675
GR 4.66 1.95 0.00 8.15 1.08 1.52 2.35 1746
ROA 0.10 0.19 -3.92 2.83 0.05 0.09 0.14 1712
STKR 0.06 0.49 -5.46 2.85 -0.13 0.09 0.30 1675
CH 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.74 0.03 0.06 0.12 1669
CF 0.14 0.19 -3.91 2.86 0.09 0.13 0.19 1647
RD 0.01 0.03 -0.30 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 1743
TAN 0.24 0.23 0.00 0.94 0.05 0.17 0.37 1664
ZSC 1.52 1.24 -13.66 16.92 0.90 1.46 2.04 1740
EO 0.05 0.22 0.00 6.06 0.00 0.00 0.01 1720
NEO 0.02 0.11 0.00 3.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 1697
LO 39.82 18.94 3.00 97.80 25.34 38.17 52.22 1708
N 1748
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the entire data used for the study. The sample comprises 213 UK FTSE 350 firms 
over the period 2007 to 2015. The variable descriptions are provided in Table 1 above
























































































































































































































































































































































































This table presents the correlation m
atrix for the sam
ple data. The sam
ple and variable definitions are as described in Table 1. * indicates significance at 1%
 level
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Table 4: Managerial and firm characteristics by leverage quartiles 
Quartile 1 Quartile 4 t-test
 CB 0.005 2.568 -1.16
[0.025] [44.131]
SB 0.018 6.808  -1.19
[0.122] [113.82]
SAL 0.007 4.889 -1.21
[0.041] [81.058]
 SZ 9.071                     8.703  5.37***
[0.737] [1.141]
GR 18.831  10.678 1.13
[146.42] [40.21]
ROA 0.122 0.045 6.02***
[0.097] [0.236]
STKR 0.117 0.006 3.51***
[0.341] [0.537]
CH 0.112 0.067                 7.15***
[0.101] [0.070]
CF 0.160 0.097                 4.34***
[0.097] [0.248]
R&D 0.010 0.001                    4.53***
[0.041] [0.003]
TAN 0.209 0.281 -4.16***
[0.203] [0.282]
ZSC 2.013 0.807 17.35***
[0.946] [1.098]
EO 0.041 0.038 0.42
[0.118] [0.112]
NEO 0.019 0.022 -0.53
[0.076] [0.067]
LO 41.285 39.113 1.64*
[19.930] [18.629]
The table above provides univariate mean comparisons of both firm-specific and managers’ incentives characteristics by book leverage (dependent 
variable) quartiles (normal font) and standard deviation (in square brackets). The t-statistics show the difference of means from the first (1st) to the 
fourth (4th) quartiles. Definitions for all the variables are shown in Table 1. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels respectively.

































































    Table 5: The effects of executive compensation (CB and SB) on leverage
(0LS) (FE) (OLS) (FE) (OLS) (FE)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6













SAL 0.721*** 0.437*** -0.278*  0.081 0.551*** 0.186
(3.57) (3.16) (1.91) (0.52) (3.77) (1.20)
SZ -0.014 -0.009  -0.025*** 0.011 -0.013 0.007
(-1.56) (-0.40) (-2.84) (0.46) (-1.54) (0.30)
GR -0.001 -0.004** -0.001 -0.004* -0.001 -0.004*
(-0.43) (-2.06) (-1.34) (-1.86) (-0.48) (-1.79)
ROA -0.077 -0.033 -0.310*** 0.096 -0.068 0.063
(-0.62) (-0.42) (-3.05) (1.16) (-0.55) (0.77)
SKTR -0.013 -0.015*** -0.008 -0.014** -0.013 -0.014**
(-1.35) (-2.70) (-0.90) (-2.53) (-1.38) (-2.43)
CH -0.179*** 0.068 -0.174*** 0.092* -0.180*** 0.088
(-3.17) (1.23) (-3.22) (1.65) (-3.24) (1.60)
CF 0.223* 0.132** 0.195* 0.103 0.213* 0.115*
(1.86) (2.07) (1.93) (1.60) (1.82) (1.81)
RD -0.348** 0.182 -0.369** 0.191* -0.341** 0.191*
(-2.57) (1.62) (-2.69) (1.69) (-2.51) (1.71)
TAN 0.046** 0.174** 0.071*** 0.279*** 0.050** 0.246***
(1.97) (2.55) (3.18) (3.90) (2.17) (3.48)
ZS -0.072*** -0.045*** -0.065*** -0.067*** -0.075*** -0.067***
(-10.00) (-4.09) (-12.07) (-5.26) (-10.41) (-5.33)
EO 0.072* -0.127* 0.100** -0.091 0.077* -0.096
(1.72) (-1.69) (2.38) (-1.20) (1.86) (-1.29)
NEO 0.203*** 0.251** 0.219*** 0.270** 0.205*** 0.271***
(2.68) (2.44) (3.10) (2.60) (2.72) (2.64)
LO -0.001* 0.001 -0.001** 0.000 -0.001* 0.000
(-1.71) (0.10) (-2.04) (0.10) (-1.62) (0.11)





















N 1202 1202 1202 1202 1202 1202
R2 0.268 0.180 0.291 0.168 0.272 0.191
The table shows the OLS estimation results of the effects of cash bonus (CB) and stock bonus on leverage. All variable definitions are described in Table 1.  *, 
** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

































































Table 6: Alternative measures of independent variables
(OLS) (OLS) (OLS)







  (3.35)  (1.68)
SAL -0.047 0.016 -0.012
(-1.60) (0.51) (-0.32)
SZ -0.033*** -0.035*** -0.035***
(-3.31) (-3.50) (-3.51)
GR -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.66) (-0.70) (-0.67)
ROA -0.078 -0.077 -0.081
(-0.66) (-0.68) (-0.70)
STKR -0.012 -0.014 -0.012
(-1.21) (-1.45) (-1.29)
CH -0.172*** -0.178*** -0.170***
(-3.05) (-3.13) (-3.03)
CF 0.180 0.181* 0.182*
(1.60) (1.65) (1.65)
RD -0.362** -0.369*** -0.367***
(-2.54) (-2.65) (-2.60)
TAN 0.056** 0.059** 0.056**
(2.31) (2.45) (2.32)
ZS -0.066*** -0.065*** -0.065***
(-8.20) (-8.16) (-8.19)
EO 0.077* 0.087** 0.081*
(1.79) (2.06) (1.91)
NEO 0.191*** 0.198*** 0.194***
(2.65) (2.79) (2.71)
LO -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-1.38) (-1.27) (-1.22)
_Cons 0.677*** 0.604*** 0.649***
(6.87) (6.43) (6.56)
N 1202 1202 1202
R2 0.263 0.264 0.265
The table shows the OLS estimation results of our alternative measures of our independent variables. All variable definitions are described in Table 1.  *, ** 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 7: Executive compensation and leverage 
                            Predicted Model                           Simultaneous Systems of Equations (3SLS)







Predicted CB -24.324** 3.066
(-2.11) (1.09)
Predicted SB   7.432*** 0.346**
 (2.88) (2.25)
SAL 0.002 15.882 0.597*** -1.887
(0.01) (1.56) (4.04) (-0.71)
SZ 0.198*** -0.056** -0.001 0.003
(6.46) (-2.47) (-0.59) (0.48)
GR -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.001** 0.002***
(-9.84) (-3.05) (-2.17) (7.06)
ROA 0.114** -1.350* -0.047** 0.147
(2.17) (-1.83) (-2.28) (0.77)
STKR 0.001 0.025 0.001 -0.004
(0.03) (0.87) (0.72) (-0.60)
CH -0.058* -0.161 0.003 -0.009
(-1.70) (-1.43) (0.30) (-0.39)
CF -0.147** 0.589 0.027 -0.084
(-2.19) (1.20) (1.48) (-0.71)
RD 0.002 -0.596* 0.006 -0.016
(0.04) (-1.78) (0.20) (-0.19)
TAN 0.317*** 0.001 -0.004 0.012
(21.03) (0.01) (-0.81) (0.60)
ZSC -0.023***  -0.081***
(-5.72) (-3.73)
EO 0.633*** 0.078 0.001 -0.001
(18.22) (0.71) (0.06) (-0.02)
NEO 0.461*** 0.274** 0.001 -0.002
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  0.954***











N 1185 1376 1376 1376
Simultaneous system of equations regression of book leverage and cash bonus results. The predicted signs for the variable of interest 
are shown in the book leverage model. The models included fixed effects in all estimations. The reported t-statistics based on robust 
standard errors are within parentheses. Cash bonus (CB) model includes leverage, controls and instruments (i.e. industry median_CB, 
two-year period log of ROA and STKR).  Variable definitions are described in Table 1. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8: Executive compensation on leverage - Role of growth and executive ownership 
(OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS)




    
   0.219
   (1.49)
  1.074***
   (4.68)
SAL 0.815*** 0.245* 0.741*** 0.486***
(3.19) (1.68) (2.70) (3.16)
SZ -0.0132 -0.0127 -0.0136 -0.0062
(-1.49) (-1.46) (-1.55) (-0.74)
GR 0.0029 0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0007
(1.56) (0.22) (-0.44) (-0.70)
ROA -0.0693 -0.0384 -0.0764 -0.0390
(-0.56) (-0.32) (-0.62) (-0.34)
STKR -0.0135 -0.0145 -0.0130 -0.0144
(-1.41) (-1.52) (-1.35) (-1.52)
CH -0.173*** -0.179*** -0.179*** -0.199***
(-3.09) (-3.21) (-3.20) (-3.74)
CF 0.215* 0.195* 0.223* 0.207*
(1.80) (1.70) (1.86) (1.91)
RD -0.354*** -0.340** -0.348** -0.326**
(-2.61) (-2.52) (-2.57) (-2.49)
TAN 0.0475** 0.0524** 0.046** 0.052**
(2.03) (2.24) (1.97) (2.29)
ZS -0.0721*** -0.0743*** -0.0722*** -0.0737***
(-9.85) (-10.06) (-9.98) (-10.92)
EO 0.0677* 0.0766* 0.0719* 0.0950**
(1.61) (1.84) (1.73) (2.30)
NEO 0.193** 0.202*** 0.203*** 0.211***
(2.51) (2.66) (2.67) (2.79)
LO -0.0005* -0.0004 -0.0005* -0.0004
(-1.69) (-1.62) (-1.71) (-1.52)
CB x GR -0.111***
(-2.76)
SB x GR -0.0023**
(-2.59)
CB x EO -0.181
(-0.22)
SB x EO -4.835***
(-5.00)
_Cons 0.460*** 0.461*** 0.469*** 0.398***
(5.30) (5.40) (5.50) (4.81)
N 1202 1202 1202 1202
R2 0.275 0.269 0.268 0.284
The table shows the OLS estimation results of the moderating role of firm growth and executive ownership. All variable definitions are described in 
Table 1.  *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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